

Language, Philosophy and Culture: Is Culturology Dialectic?

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is to examine the bearings among language, philosophy, and culture, and to make analysis of the culturology in terms of the methodology of dialectic.

Key words : Language, Philosophy, Culturology, Dialectic

I. Introduction: Culturology in Wittgensteinean Term

Culture is conceived of as something individual to each individual society, nation, gender, race, and so on. Culturology is correspondent with cultural studies. The theme of Culturology is culture as the principal structure of various cultures-- race, community, gender, and so on. In culturology, a social form of thought, action, and notions is presumed, and the fundamental notion of a whole and inseparable discipline is presented.

We live in a multiple world, and the idea of multiplicity reveals the cultural identity. Multiplicity has served to stimulate the significance of cultural faithfulness and harmony. However, inconsistently, multiplicity has been predisposed to disregard the significance of harmony and has failed to identify its nature as a bountiful idea. Races, community, gender, and so on are cultural forms. Are these multiple cultural forms really independent from each other? Or, do these multiple cultural forms depend upon each other to present the groundwork for a potential cultural synthesis?

How can multiple cultural identities join together without disposing of their natures and characteristics? It has the high priority for the present-day civilizations to identify the forms of this new conformity based on multiple significances. It is a kind of ordeal to deal with the term, 'culturology'. It has been over 30 years since I embarked upon the study of culturology, with the academic experiences of philosophy and comparative literature. It is just about time to make *some* assumption of what 'culturology' is, although it is not clear whether or not I am going to be committed to some kind of nightmare. Nonetheless, I should like to move toward this trial, relying on the understanding and support of the readers of this paper as well as the observers. If I am able to achieve anything, regardless of the effects and answers, in a theoretical order, that must be my contribution anyway. I have tried to organize and/or reorganize the resources, while approving and/or disapproving each other, and have made available some grounds for

analyses and assumptions. Culturology is not derived from cultural anthropology. Culturology, I mean, is independent of any sect or discipline, apart from holding literature and philosophy underneath as the foundation. Culturology I deal with in this paper is in the Wittgensteinian term. It certainly is an inexplicable issue to see how one develops one's scholarly benefits. For, it is unconditionally uncontrolled and unwarranted that one develops what one chose instinctively. There is no reason why one chooses what. One true thing about is that this is one's innate selections and empathies and one has innate, unquestionably unjustifiable sense, at no cost, of substantiation of what one chose.

What philosophy is different from literature is that it is intrinsically dialectic. This is the beauty of philosophy and at the same time it is disgraceful. The beauty of philosophy is that the mind ability must be wholly manifested and proved in philosophy. On the other hand, the disgrace of philosophy is that the appeal of dialectic is seductive and induces us to a farfetched argument, and in the end, plunges us into literalism and pedantry. In philosophy, everything can be in the domain of the dialectic conditions. All hypotheses call for an issue and an answer to the issue, and this brings about further issues. The fundamental mission of philosophy, which is to describe and make analysis of the hypothesis, introduces us a process which has no conveyable expression. The process is flowing, twisting, never ending, impressive, and irregular. We have a good apology in philosophy that we can expose anything else to the reservation, whence causes some harsh and/or vague ambiguities towards other dialogues and discourses. We fall into a maze, by discovering a dialectic, which we try to be as much dedicated as possible to our natural ability and try not to misrepresent the method of dialectic to defend the weaknesses of trendy arguments. And yet, we have been exposed with the phobia that the dialectic may cause effects on the dignity in the conventional law and commitment of a community. This is the undeniable fact in the history of philosophy.

Literature is a zealous theme in philosophy, and has been of the fundamental interest. The correlation between these two forms of discourse, the literature and the philosophy, the prose and the dialectic, resembles the correlation between like and dislike, a day and a night. The unforgettable and impressive lines are in the prose, but the lines may be refuted by the dialectic. The lines in the prose have the power of incantation, but are not logical. The prose and the dialectic are not as rigid as they used to be. In the prose, the issue is not right or wrong, but likes or dislikes. Literature is not sought any longer after blissful statements. Stylish stories are contributed in the literature, and if a reader happens to like the story, it helps him to kill his boredom, in which case the writer, a man of letters is not a man of industry and science. Literature has been the central sphere of man's life, until the philistinism gained power for the truth-seeking convention, with the middle-class upheaval.

"For *Philistine* gives the notion of something particularly stiff-necked and perverse in the resistance to light and its children; and therein it specially suits our middle class, who not only

do not pursue sweetness and light, but who even prefer to them that sort of machinery of business, chapels, tea-meetings, and addresses from Mr. Murphy and the Rev. W. Cattle, which makes up the dismal and illiberal life on which I have so often touched. But the aristocratic class has actually, as we have seen, in its well-known politeness, a kind of image or shadow of sweetness; and as for light, if it does not pursue light, it is not that it perversely cherishes some dismal and illiberal existence in preference to light, but it is lured off from following light by those mighty and eternal seducers of our race which weave for this class their most irresistible charms, — by worldly splendour, security, power and pleasure. These seducers are exterior goods, but in a way they are goods; and he who is hindered by them from caring for light and ideas, is not so much doing what is perverse as what is too natural.”¹⁾

I do not mean that literature is not an acceptable or comprehensible discipline in philosophy. The underlying principle of literature may have been made an attempt to figure out, whereas the philosophical discipline has no argument for the concept of literature to be a fundamental human activity. Literature seeks after pleasure and happiness, not after a fact or reality.

It is an invariable principle that whatever is removed from power by dialectic can be recovered again only by dialectic. Hence, if it is not acceptable that literature is something discretionary and pleasing to the eye, then we must participate in the argument that truth is applicable to a literary discourse and a literary discourse is valuable for the nature of human life and the nature of human dilemma.

In order to develop the arguments whether or not Culturology is dialectic, I should begin with the literary and philosophical background and nature underneath the stream of consciousness in the fundamental structure of various cultures such as gender, race, community, and so on; and I would like to raise a question what is the credibility to verify what is expressed by words, in language to describe a structure of a culture, is dialectic.

II . Language, Philosophy, and Culturology

Writing a literary piece is writing a story, and factual descriptions should be cast in a literary form. Some questions, which are accepted in a piece of historical story, may not be suitable in some other pieces of story. *Mutatis mutandis*, a writer of a historical story can make up a story and say anything irresponsibly. However, the difficulty is that it is not possible for the readers of a piece of historical story to confirm the incidents of history, and the readers can just imagine and accept the incidents in a historical story. It is not easy even to doubt about the consistency of the questions themselves whether the incident is true or not. To start with, the category of stories is more extensive than the category of invented and counterfeit descriptions. Some stories or some incidents in a novel may be based on the previous facts and these stories and incidents may not conflict with what is generally taken to be the sequence and character of the past events. The issue is, surely, more intricate here. Above all, can't a particular historian be categorized to be one of the great artists like the writers, for he *does* write a story? There are some stories

with very little conventional significance, which we do not wish to categorize them as insightful ones. Conventional significance may be, for example, how to reply to a door to door pedlar, how to make greetings among the neighbours, how to make a weather report, etc. Some artistic people may bring these things to the stage of an insightful dialogue. What we must be careful about is, however, no matter how effectively these things are described in an insightful dialogue, our interests may fall into some simple greeting, report, and/or reply, in a fastidious circumstance. No matter how profound the conventional significance is, it may become superficial in the existing real circumstance.

I use, here, the term, 'culturological', extensively, in complicated anecdotes, narratives, epigrams, oral stories, dramatic pieces, folk stories, etc., not just in culturology. A discourse of scientific field can very well be culturological, in this sense, whereas other people may call the discourse a piece of science. Culturology is philosophical rather than historical, and in this term, culturology is dialectic. To come to the point, the substance of culturology is the unique quality of the culturological interest, and the writing a culturological piece of work is exactly of the culturological activity.

The issue in respect of *all* culturological discourses is that a range of dialectic discourses has a range of words, statements, and expressions, and how these words, statements, and expressions get the meanings that they have.

The philosophy of language has a determined convention, and one of the persuasive refutations in the contemporary arguments is that a thought and the way how the thought is expressed are of different attributes. A culture and the way how the culture is expressed, *mutatis mutandis*, are of different attributes. In the recent discussions of the philosophy of language, we are strongly inclined to agree with that the thought and the symbol by which it is corresponded, or *mutatis mutandis*, the sense and the expression are of different quality. This may be our innate prejudgments in the matter, but this observation cannot be illogical in every respect. We have different expressions to mean one and the same thing. One and the same thing X is described by Y and Z, and Y and Z are similar and compatible sentences. This *does* sound right, without a doubt. If we admit what Y and Z express is one and the same thought, there corresponds a distinction of objects that one object is expressed by Y, whereas the other object is expressed by Z. These two objects denote one and the same thought. This is axiom.

Words and sentences get the meaning by applying the relation of 'denoting' to ideas. Words and sentences are one set of object. Thought is another set of object. Here is an example. We say, "It *must* be like such and such". Here, we are given a description of what is followed dialectically from our talking about intentions to express thoughts. The '*must*' here is of the essence. Another meditative account would be something like: 'when I think about the existence of black holes in the universe in cosmology, it was as though there were huge clouds over my head'. Another might say: '„it reminds me of Vincent van Gogh's *The Starry Night*'. Another might say: 'I have thought about it very hard, and I would conclude that I have no account on that'. One potential verification is, however,

that the above three are all expressing the same set of object, when asked to express about the existence of black holes in the universe. The way how the above three expression about the existence of black holes is different, but the set of object they express about the existence of black holes is the same.

The description, here, of what it is for words and sentences to have meaning is not a mis-description but a pseudo-description. And if this pseudo-description were correct, then it would be without an explanation to confirm the meaning of a word and/or a sentence. This is, however, unreservedly bizarre, for we do think we do know the meanings of words and sentences. Here is another example, 'sounds'. How do we know the meaning of 'sounds'? The only way to describe the meaning of 'sounds' is to hear the sound and the internal comprehension of the sound, namely, the sign. On the other hand, the thoughts are conveyed by words. As a consequence, there is no evidence that sounds can be transformed into words. For this reason, we could never make a sound that would be regarded as a word. The argument is, I must admit, paradoxical.

It is, without a doubt, acceptable to talk about a sentence and the thought which is expressed in the sentence, for we can translate at least some Japanese sentences into sentences in other languages, e.g. the English language, and of course, we can also have more than two different Japanese sentences that express the same thought. What we must be careful about is that the passages, which are meant to express the same thought, may not correspond to each other. Suggestions, characters, temperaments, qualities, which are attached to the Japanese expressions, are not so attributed to the English expressions. The translators must renounce a literal description, and this corresponds to the limits of media for the structure of various cultures— race, community, gender, etc. to form a culturological discourse. We may say that the translator is using stylistic piece of equipments that belong to the Japanese language and not to the English language, by putting the English sentence in disorder to some extent, but still it is worth translating in order to present, at least, an equivalent expression. It should be pointed out, on the other hand, that two Japanese sentences may express the same thought with no correspondence to each of these two sentences. This can be, without difficulty, demonstrated by comparing out-of-date and up-to-date translations of a piece of work.

There is no problem to talk about a sentence and the thought which the sentence expresses. But, there *is* a problem if a sentence expresses a thought at one time and does not express a thought at other times. If the sentence does not express a thought, then there is no way we can exemplify it as a sentence. Is a sentence without a thought a sentence? No, it cannot be. A sequence of sounds, marks, or symbols has no ground that it is a sentence. Taking an example from a Mongolian spot, that is common among the Asians, American Indians, and Africans, we may make a distinction between a skin and a blue Mongolian spot on the skin. From this distinction to the existence of two independent objects, a skin and a blue Mongolian spot, there is no assumption. A blue Mongolian spot on the skin could exist independently from the skin. I do not wish to continue the argu-

ment further, for I believe it cannot be true. Words are the only means of transportation of a thought. The notion, however, that can be thought quite besides words, a means of transportation, is a false notion. Another example, I know my awesome Standard Schnauzer *Lucky* can *think*, and *Lucky* and my Miniature Schnauzer *Maron* communicate with each other, without using words. But, I have no idea whatsoever what their thinking consists in.

I now take advantage of making analysis of the hypothesis of a culturological discourse in Wittgensteinian term. The hypothesis of a culturological discourse has not been taken very seriously and has been dishonoured by being even labeled, the heterodoxy of interpretation. It is the hypothesis of a culturological discourse that *what* is described and *how* it is described in a culturological piece of work are two different things.

The hypothesis of a culturological discourse is approved of in an informative and moralistic piece of culturological work, which gives us account of some pseudo-logical points of view of nature or of human concern. I would like to advance my theory further on this belief. The hypothesis of a culturological discourse forms a measured, not incoherent, nor insufficient structure. Thoughts are seen through the medium of words, and the features of thoughts are laid emphasis on by effective words. Here, we have the feature of thought as well as the feature of the expression of thought. As outlined previously, the thought is expressed in words which are the feature of our mind, and consequently, the feature of our mind, sometimes, can not be seen as it should be. The feature of the expression of thought has its own significance, for it implies an underlying quality of cultural forms, and an underlying quality of cultural forms reveals a measure of self-knowledge that rests in the stream of cultural consciousness.

It does not seem to be easy to defend the hypothesis of a culturological discourse. Whatever the words are transformed into other words of the same language, without lessening the connotation of the words, either in implication or in explication, or in any other commendable sensitivity, it is a spiteful thing to do with the language. This point of view seems to be supported by Matthew Arnold's view of poetry in the nineteenth-century.

"More and more mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us. Without poetry, our science will appear incomplete; and most of what now passes with us for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry."²⁾

We would have to accept, I dare to say, that critics' exercise of the method of textual analysis has made the deep-rooted theory exceedingly questionable, because this exercise has indicated that to reveal the significance of a culturological discourse implies to show how the significance is revealed by concealed suggestions and insinuations, a sequence of features, and the particular order of words, in the culturological discourse under analysis. The meaning of a piece of the culturological discourse is not to be asserted but is to be

revealed. The meaning is so exclusively a task of a particular verbal structure of a culturological discourse that it is not achievable to keep emphasizing what a writer of the culturological discourse wants to distinguish a certain interests; to keep laying siege to the core; to keep functioning effectively; and to keep a set of elaborations enjoyable.

Does the meaning have to be so? Suppose we accept that the expressions in regular, customary discourse *can be* translated without deficiency of connotation either into other expressions in the same language or into expressions in another language. Then, how can we be sure that culturology is, in effect, such that this can never be done, as it should be, in the case of a culturological discourse? It is unachievable to present sufficient translations of these specific forms, and it is just not inferred from here that the thing is impossible, with respect to other specific forms. Can we justifiably infer *anything* about the tendencies and inclinations of all creatures from, e.g., the manner of dogs? We cannot. Let us develop the arguments further that it is unorthodox, no matter what the culturological discourse under debate may be, to believe in the possibility of translating a culturological discourse.

In line with the quality of culturological discourses, it is always heterodox to believe in the possibility of translation. I have already brought it to mind that it is a nature of a culturological discourse that some issues cannot be, as it should be, asked about. We just cannot ask for the answers whether "Bochan" in *Bochan* in Soseki Natsume married in the end, or not; how the wives of 47 masterless samurais of Ako carried their lives without their husbands. We are inclined to presume that we can ask such questions because the attempts of a culturological discourse are in the form of likelihood, so that nothing can be said metaphorically that would not be suitable for a discourse of another kind. In the same way, a culturological discourse can have the form of a catchphrase, a logical and technical simplification, a theological theory, an authority, an ethical verdict, and a theoretical thesis. Whatever can be expressed in forms of a discourse, which have simple, clear-cut functions, can be expressed metaphorically in the form of likelihood. The difference between a culturological and other forms of a discourse is that some of the involvements of a discourse, which belong to other forms, are confined, in a culturological discourse as well.

Now, I wish to argue, and I hope it is going to be a convincing argument, that some of the ordinary involvements in a culturological discourse are confined, because of the impossibility of translation. I wish to make analysis of a principle that a culturological discourse is set apart from other discourses by certain pragmatically conclusive qualities, more or less, inconsistency and uncertainty; a principle that appears to be a presumption of much criticism: a few things are, some of us may have admitted, meant, at the same time, in a piece of culturology. Undoubtedly, in culturology, uncertainty and inconsistency can be associated with each other and affect us profoundly, and the critic can show that the intensity and force of such culturology to influence us can take advantage of these means. Uncertainty and inconsistency, however, could only be the characteristic symbols,

in effect, of culturology if we did not benefit from uncertainty and inconsistency in other forms of a discourse. Needless to say, this is just clearly wrong. We may be able to verify inductively that uncertainty and inconsistency are much more general in culturology than in any other forms of a discourse, but this would not have an effect on my assumption. For, just imagine a society where the opposite is true. In fact, cars are driven on the left-hand side in the roads in England, just like in Japan, whereas cars are driven on the right-hand side in the roads in France. In Scotland, men wear a skirt, whereas only women wear a skirt in Japan! In a society where the opposite is true, the culturology may be clear and transparent, whereas other forms of a discourse are complicated and problematic with uncertainty and inconsistency. Let me advance and put in plain words what I mean by saying that some of the involvements that belong to other kinds of a discourse than a culturological discourse, are restricted. I have already made a point that it would not give a good reason for by asking a certain various questions about explanatory or instructive culturology. If Soseki Natsume informs us of "Bochan", it would be out of place and out of time to ask whom "Bochan" married and whether he was happy with her, or not. The questions would be unreservedly proper if Bochan's marriage were affirmed in history, just as England is seagirt. A final example: it might be justifiable, culturology-wise, to write a piece of a culturological discourse which some qualities of the black hole had been figured into its cosmological structure; and if someone objected to what was written, then we can simply answer that this piece of a culturological discourse is not making any contribution to the natural world.

If it is granted that the general involvements are restricted in a culturological discourse, and this is a necessary quality of a culturological discourse, then is it inseparable what is said and how in a culturological discourse, if not in other forms of a discourse? Needless to say, we cannot divide the how from the what, even in other forms of a discourse, which brings up other questions. I would answer as follows: Granted that we make no mistakes in language rules, when we, for example, describe the world, how we describe it is important and it has much to do with the strength and intensity of our description, whereas it has very little to do whether our description is accurate or not. No one has ever succeeded in proving that it is true of sentences in a natural language that a true fact-stating sentence is fitted to the state of situations. If we could make it true by practice in an artificial language, whatever was said in an artificial language could be said otherwise in a natural language, and we could also justify the convention. Then, descriptive uses of language may be translated, not with the force and suggestion but with their character as statements of the case. There is more than one form of words, and more than one form of words could be said to mean the same thing. As a final point, it does not seem to be of any importance between the following two statements: Mr. A tells Mr. B that Mr. B should be in time for the meeting; Mr. A tells Mr. B that Mr. B should not be late for the meeting. What are the qualities of such uses of language that make them exposed to translation? If someone does intend that there is a case here, then what makes a sentence

true or false depends on whether or not there is a case. And the form *how* the case is affirmed is not relevant. *Mutatis mutandis*, what makes such uses of language predisposed of translation, is that what is said is controlled by some state of affairs, prior to what is said. The qualities of the world is prior to what may be said about them.

It is not controlled by any state of affairs prior to what is said whether what is said in the culturological discourse is competent or not. Culturological descriptions are neither true nor false, whereas factual descriptions are true or false, and this follows from their being culturological. It does not guarantee X that I guarantee X in my imagination, for I do not do anything in my imagination. Imagination is made only in the world of imagination, not in the real, factual world. I only imagine that I guarantee this or that, so it does not give a real, factual description to give a fictitious description, though a fictitious description has the form of a description, just as the guarantee I imagine, that I guarantee, has the form of a guarantee. Therefore, there could be no criterion, in a fictitious description, for deciding whether the *alternative* description had succeeded or not, whereas there would be criterion in the case of a real description. Hence, I could not give an *alternative* culturological description. The culturological description has the form of a description of which words are only in the descriptive order. Consequently, what is said and how it is said are indiscernible so far as they are in other forms of a discourse.

III . Is Culturology Dialectic?

It is not my assumption that truth has no relevance to a culturological discourse, but it *is* my assumption that the way in which truth has relevance is to be presented. We should be content with this pseudo-justification. That is, culturological discourses perceive their awareness from a metaphysical shadow-world. Also, culturological discourses find their relevance in a metaphysical shadow-world. The descriptions of a culturological discourse as the world of nature and human affairs are in a metaphysical shadow-world. The above observation is supported by the descriptions to other forms of a discourse. If I made an observation that one of the things we would like to consider, in terms of the value of a piece of culturology, is whether or not the piece of culturology corresponds truthfully to a feature of life, then I would be pronouncing a desperate anachronism that goes back to the distant past and at the same time has been a stream in every epoch. A culturological discourse has much to do with the world of nature and human affairs, thus an alternative to a metaphysical shadow-world would be only a last practical and feasible task, since all other possibilities have been terminated. The culturology is the representation of man and nature.

'Reality', 'precision', 'symbol', 'view', 'realism', 'honesty', et cetera are the principal hypotheses we should reveal. If we do comprehend what it is for a culturological description to 'correspond to' a feature of life with a 'view' of man and nature, then we shall know a culturological description *is* a realistic description, *mutatis mutandis*, a valid view.

A description or view of something will hold a different view from what is described,

in several ways. If a thing is described *flawlessly*, then it would not be a description of the thing, but it would be the thing itself. If someone proposed me to marry him and he made his proposal in writing, thinking himself that he is only playing at making a proposal of marriage, he *has* proposed marriage, and I will have good grounds for bringing an action for a breach of promise that he was only playing at making a proposal and he does not intend to marry me. If I made a sound of howling which is good enough to trick those, including any dog, who hear the sound, then I have howled like a dog does. If I try to give details by gestures and body language of what it is like to be so sorrowful, and I become so involved with my presentation, then it is not that I am trying to be like a sorrowful person, but I *am* a sorrowful person. These above things are not descriptions but these are the things they assert themselves to be. Sure enough, we can only plunge into the blunder of thinking there could be a 'flawless' description where the medium of description is one and the same with what is described. A howl like the howl of a dog is a howl, and so in the other way round. Then, there is the kind of description which is a trick, a bloodstain made of ketchup and an apple made of plastic. These 'flawless' descriptions consist in their tricking us into thinking they are the real thing, for the moment. There is, however, something contrary in descriptions of this kind; these stimulate the probabilities that the real things would stimulate; and then we are unexpectedly frustrated. We admit that we are happy in considering what are not descriptions, as well as, we are happy in considering the descriptions of things that we would like to consider, or of things that we find hideous. We would not be happy or we would be only disagreeably happy in the descriptions that are, at the start, considered to be the things they stand for.

A description to be considered as the kind of description must be, as far as we know, well-defined from what is described. The kind of description is what we are involved with in the arts, and this is a comprehensive point about the arts and is certainly not idiosyncratic to the art of culturology. This is undeniably a significance of what I said earlier about its being a feature of a culturological discourse that the general involvements are abbreviated in it. If we doubt whether the general involvements are abbreviated, or not, then we would feel anxious. On the other hand, if someone acting Peter Pan *did* fly in reality on the stage, we would say this is not a theatrical, affected presentation.

Let us turn around the argument. If we were in doubt that someone is acting as though he/she were crying, then we would say that he/she is in a theatrical, affected presentation, trying to be misleading us. Then, there is no need that we should assess a culturological discourse as veritable or reliable, on the argument that we have been deceived into mistaking the description for the thing described. Needless to say, the art of culturology does not contribute itself to fraud, except in theatrical, affected presentations. A culturological representation of a dispute cannot be confused with a dispute itself. Likewise, a culturological discourse cannot be thought to be veritable or reliable for its flawless representation of some events or flawless statement of a reliable description of some expected observable facts. A culturological discourse may be any of these but its

quality as a culturological discourse cannot be appreciated as representations, descriptions, or observable facts. One does not necessarily have to visit, for example, Scotland to appraise Shakespeare's *Macbeth*. If one has considered the natural and social worlds in a relatively insightful way, then some worth pieces of culturology can be written; but no distinct piece of culturology is associated with a distinct state of affairs, as no distinct description of events is associated with the events themselves. We could examine the exactness of the events by discussing the piece of the whole events themselves in issue; we could examine the exactness of a description by questioning bystanders, examining pictures, and looking for routes. There can be no such brief and simple means to examine the realism or the honesty of a culturological discourse.

We use the term 'reality' in various ways and retain diverse criteria in various cases in the language of culturological assessment. This would not be an unpredicted outcome on the whole, for the equivalent thing is presented in other further fields. My arguments for standing up for that racial discrimination is ethically criminal, that my female Miniature Schnauzer is on heat, that my grandchild is not happy, are all very diverse. Equally, I would use the different criteria for each case, if I wish to argue for the reality of each different culturological description. On the other hand, the ground for saying that the reality in racial discrimination, in my female Miniature Schnauzer's being on heat, and in my grandchild's being unhappy is different in each case, has different grounds, although the statements, e.g. that racial discrimination is ethically criminal, that my female Miniature Schnauzer is on heat, that my grandchild is not happy, are true.

The reason why we may have for attributing reality to a culturological description is that it exposes the nature of our inner feelings to us, although the description of our inner feelings, which is different from the culturological description, is not a satisfactory description. We may have preceding and objective knowledge of a certain affairs, but the reality stated in the culturological discourse is not situated in its corresponding state of affairs.

The inner life may be presented through introspection. We normally talk of our abilities, emotions, characters, ardors, and so forth, as introspection is to the spirit and thought. The ambiguities in the description are various, and these ambiguities presented the problems that are central themes of *Philosophical Investigations* of the later Wittgenstein.

"302. If one has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I *do not feel* on the model of the pain which I *do feel*. That is, what I have to do is not simply to make a transition in imagination from one place of pain to another. As, from pain in the hand to pain in the arm. For I am not to imagine that I feel pain in some region of his body. (Which would also be possible.)

Pain-bahaviour may point to a painful place — but the subject of pain is the person who

gives it expression.

303. "I can only *believe* that someone else is in pain, but I *know* it if I am." — Yes: one can make the decision to say "I believe he is in pain" instead of "He is in pain". But that is all. --- What looks like an explanation here, or like a statement about a mental process, is in truth an exchange of one expression for another which, while we are doing philosophy, seems the more appropriate one.

Just try --- in a real case--- to doubt someone else's fear or pain."³⁾

I think it is unfeasible to characterize the inner life through introspection. Here is an example. I have a doubt how to characterize a consciousness, thus it is unfeasible to characterize whether or not one is in pain. Pain is unquestionably something of 'the inner life', and it is not compatible to communicate one's pain to another, as one cannot show one's pain to another. How does one learn to characterize one of his/her consciousnesses as a pain? The significance of this question is that I should previously discern the meaning of the word 'pain', hence my applying the concept of pain to my own case is a preceding provision. This entails that my uses of the word 'pain' and others' uses of the word 'pain' must have the same elements and entities. The meanings of words denote a concealed means of the inner life, which cannot be demonstrated, hence, we only have the public language to communicate our inner life, so how can we know that others are in pain? We can know that others are in pain only by seeing what they do and by listening to what they say, *mutatis mutandis*, by observing their behaviour. Hence, we only determine to describe our own inner life through determining the behavioural criteria for attributing pain both to others and to ourselves. The inner life, then, does not allow their designations on their surfaces. We cannot employ the concept of pain to our own case, if we could not learn the criteria for determining whether or not others are in pain.

We can not determine how to express and distinguish our inner life only by introspection. We can not talk about our inner life without using the words which are recognized in the public language. Equally, it is not possible for us to represent the world of nature and human affairs without using the language. I now advance the argument further that it is essentially linked with being able to give some description, by using the language, of what it is that we understand what it is, although the description may not be sufficiently inclusive. It is not that we understand something and then we communicate, through a theoretical system, what we understand. This type of communication is a part of understanding. We talk about our inner life in terms of hypotheses which the minds are symbolized; we talk about our inner life in terms of the bodies we happen to have. Our inner life has our own joy, sorrow, love, hate, desire, jealousy, and so on, and this is a concealed theatre. The performances in a concealed theatre are not the theme of the mind nor of one's communications.

Presume if we are not in love, then the state of feeling, 'being in love' can be taken to

be false and stupid. This can be realized quite conversely; and this brings out the function of the culturological description in revealing the character of our emotions and nature, to us. We may be mistaken in assuming that we love someone whom we are in love with, but the ability to describe our own state depends upon our having measure for determining when others are in love. These measures we get from a specific cultural tradition have mediated to us in a numerous ways. If we are in love, we would know it, because having feelings that can be recognized and expressed is not independent from the theoretical activity of recognition and expression. Assuming that my Schnauzer dogs have feelings, and I am sure they do, is it achievable to say that such feelings must be quite different from ours, and also is it achievable that such feelings cannot be known in expression? What we can assume is that other animals like my Schnauzer dogs have an experienced accord of their inner development and outward performance. What is characteristically human is that we humans have the feeling but we do not show our feeling in our behaviour, whereas other animals have no equivalence.

Our inner life is characterized through the application of schemes that are represented from the general multiple information, *mutatis mutandis*, we are in pain when we are in pain just like others are in pain; we are in love when we are in love just like others are in love. On the other hand, each of us is an individual and cannot be another, of which his/her record and description, the relations to others, and so forth are unique, hence it is wrong to characterize our individual inner life through schemes that are represented from the general multiple information. The inner life is represented, not in their individuality, but in respect of their similarity to the inner life of others. There is no thorough analysis for this being wrong about, and it may be faded away and be made no argument, with the culturological description. With the culturological description which gives us the representation of man and nature, we share our inner life with others, and this is the response of a culturological description. We must be aware of that the representation of man and nature cannot be articulated in the general series of hypotheses, but can be articulated in a particular individual concrete representation, and only through this particular individual concrete representation can our universal humanity be articulated. In the culturological description, the words are in order and they can not be translated and the description is unreservedly individual; thus, in the culturological description, the words communicate to us as well as to others, although we *feel* the words communicate only to us. Some hypotheses are represented from the general multiple information, and these hypotheses characterize the inner life, but the inner life may be characterized in mechanical and minimal terms. On the other hand, the inner life is described through the involvedness and inner strength in the culturological description, and this amounts to that the inner life is involved, precious, and valuable on this description.

There is much in our inner life as well as in our relations with other people and other society, which is the foundation of our competence for ethical and spiritual communication. We understand them, not steadily but even with difficulty, and those ordeal does

help us develop our further understanding. We learn what it is to be in pain through experiencing pain itself as well as learning to use the language. Likewise, we learn that our inner life is multifaceted, and the multifaceted inner life flows into the life of society, and the multifaceted inner life draws much of its fundamental nature in the culturological description. A culturological description is a hypothesis in that it is something made by our communication; if not our communication, then it is something beyond our knowledge and comprehension. A hypothesis is not an *image* of reality but a means of knowledge and comprehension, thus the truth belongs to the hypothesis only in the measure of assumption, either deductive or inductive. Correspondingly the culturological description finds its truth in its established competence to our knowledge and comprehension of ourselves and of our society. The representation of man and nature is not a figurative information of something that just happens to be there. The representation of man and nature is a means of knowledge and comprehension.

I certainly do not have the audacity, although, to be honest, I would like to have, to make an attempt for a comprehensive explanation of how a specific culturological description can perform as a means of knowledge and comprehension and of how, as thus performing, it may be explained 'valid', in this discourse. All I could do would be that I can argue for an essential case of the competence of culturology that can be applied not for one person or one society but for the majority of men and societies.

The art of culturology is an essential factor for the discipline of the receptivity, the susceptibility, and the awareness, in a distinctive mode, and this allows us not only to appreciate ourselves, but also to regard the human settings in the representations which articulate for all men, not this or that individual person and/or society, but all mankind, in the same dilemma. And in this rests the truth of the representation, in its capacity to increase the understanding of our common nature. True enough, only in the art of culturology is beauty manifested, *mutatis mutandis*, if not, the beauty of the art of culturology is not a manifestation of an inner beauty of human beings. Otherwise, how do we see an inner beauty of human beings, if not in the art of culturology, nor in music, nor in any other art? How could we be positive enough that human life is receptive to the beautiful and to the love that are presented in the art of culturology? We do see an inner beauty of human beings in the art of culturology, which presents cultural features. Thus, culturology is to be presented dialectically.

Notes:

- 1) *Culture and Anarchy* Matthew Arnold Edited with an introduction by J. Dover Wilson Cambridge at the University Press 1971 pp.101~102
- 2) *Essays on English Literature* Matthew Arnold Selected and edited by F.W.Bateson University of London Press Ltd. 1965 p.109
- 3) *Philosophical Investigations* Ludwig Wittgenstein Translated by G.E.M.Anscombe Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2001 302 and 303 p.86

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